In spring 2014, an explosive outbreak of MERS-Coronavirus in Jeddah caused conjectures about changes in viral transmissibility. Functional examination of circulating viruses as well as analyses of diagnostic laboratory data suggest causation by nosocomial transmission of a biologically unchanged virus.
Introduction
The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was discovered in 2012 and has since been found to cause sporadic cases and small case clusters of severe acute respiratory illness [1] . All patients occurred in the Arabian peninsula or had epidemiological links to the region. The total number of notified cases since 2012 was 199 as of 25 March 2014 [2] . From the end of March through April 2014 an exponential increase of new cases occurred in Saudi Arabia with a focus in Jeddah, causing conjectures about potential changes in fundamental epidemiological parameters [3] .
Hypotheses to explain the outbreak pattern include increased surveillance, increased zoonotic transmission, increasing nosocomial transmission, changes in viral transmissibility, as well as false positive results due to laboratory errors. The latter option caused concern about the validity of the overall case count notified to WHO [3] .
To fully appreciate the extensive outbreak in Jeddah, it will be necessary to reconstruct transmission chains and dissect the epidemiology in such a way that fundamental epidemiological parameters can be inferred. While these analyses may take considerable 
Materials and Methods

RT-PCR and sequencing
All procedures followed protocols described previously [5] [6] [7] . JRL used LightMix kits (TIB Molbiol) containing pre-mixed primers and probe for the upE and ORF1A assays to minimize the risk of reagent-based contamination and detection artifacts [5] . Primers for viral genome sequencing are available upon request.
Virus isolation
Samples were inoculated in VeroB4 cells seeded at 3x10 5 cells/mL in 24well plates 16h prior to infection, for 1 h at 37°C. Cells were incubated at 37°C and checked daily for cytopathogenic effects. Every 2 days, cell culture supernatant was sampled and tested by real-time RT-PCR for increase of MERS-CoV-specific viral RNA. PCR positive wells were harvested and used for the production of virus stocks. Virus stocks were quantified by plaque titration on VeroB4 cells as described earlier [8] .
Virus growth kinetics
A549 cells (ATCC CCL-185) were seeded at 2x10 5 cells/well in 24 well plates 16 h prior to infection. At 1, 8, 24, 48 and 72 h post infection, supernatants were sampled and the increase of MERS-CoV-specific viral RNA quantified by real-time RT-PCR [8] .
Plaque titration and neutralization assay
VeroB4 cells were seeded at 1.5x10 5 cells/well in 24 well plates 16 h prior to titration.
Cells were overlaid after infection with 500 µL Avicel (FCM BioPolymer) at a final concentration of 1.2% in DMEM [9] . Three days post infection, cells were fixed in 6% formaldehyde and stained with crystal violet solution. For neutralization assay [10, 11] , 25 plaque forming units of MERS-CoV were pre-incubated with diluted serum for one hour at 37°C .
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Results
Laboratory performance and overall diagnostic results
Case identification and notification during the outbreak in Jeddah was mainly based on laboratory testing. To obtain insight into laboratory testing during the outbreak, the sample reception list in JRL was analyzed (Figure 1 ). There was a striking increase of diagnostic requests during April which was mainly caused by samples from Jeddah Table 1 ). While the laboratory entry list did not identify the symptoms status of patients, it indicated by presence of a patient identifier code whether cases were in hospital or likely part of a contact investigation ( Table 1) . There was a marked increase of contact investigations in Jeddah versus other locations.
Expectedly, the proportion of samples with low viral loads (indicated by high Ct values) was high in contact investigations (Figures 1C and D).
Studies of reliability of laboratory procedures as presented in Supplementary dataset
1 did not reveal any evidence for generic background contamination in the laboratory.
Viral genome sequence and phylogeny
Seven viruses from the Jeddah outbreak were entirely sequenced and compared with full-length or subtotal genome sequences available in April 2014 in GenBank (Supplementary Table 2 ). An analysis of major reading frames across the genome To better evaluate the diversity of viruses circulating in Jeddah, single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) were studied ( Table 2) . All samples except one had the same combination of SNPs. The one deviating sample was taken on April 22nd and had a double peak in one SNP that was confirmed twice by repetition of RT-PCR and sequencing. Further partial sequencing of this virus did not yield any other double peaks, suggesting the ongoing formation of quasispecies as described before [14] , rather than simultaneous infection with two viruses. The sequences from a US case and a case in Riyadh with known travel histories to Jeddah had Jeddah-typical SNP patterns ( Table   2 ). In contrast, viruses detected in Jeddah one month and 5 months before the outbreak did not cluster with the Jeddah-type outbreak viruses. A virus detected in Riyadh (SA2014_158) was related to camel viruses sharing a recent common ancestor with Jeddah-type outbreak viruses, but was distinct in its SNP pattern.
Virus infection studies
To study potential alterations in virus functions, 16 The type I interferon system is among the most efficient innate antiviral defenses. As MERS-CoV EMC/2012 was shown to be highly susceptible against type I interferon, infection trials were done in Vero cells pre-treated with interferon alpha to induce an antiviral state prior to infection in cells at MOI = 0.01. Even though Vero cells are known to induce an efficient antiviral state upon external IFN stimulus, no differences between the three viral strains were seen (Figure 3E) .
Antibody functions provide a laboratory correlate of adaptive immunity. As viruses may differ in their robustness against neutralizing antibodies, all three viruses were subjected to plaque reduction neutralization assays using serum of a MERS patient with known antibody titer [7] . No relevant differences in the reduction of viral plaques depending on serum dilution were seen with any virus (Figure 3F) .
Viral loads
Viral load data reflect clinical virus excretion, which cannot be modeled in cell culture. Ct values as a surrogate of viral loads were compared between samples from Jeddah and other cities (Figure 4 A and B) Figure 4C . There was a subjective trend toward lower Ct values by the third week. However, these points were identified as outlier values and mean viral loads did not differ significantly in any of the weeks of April according to ANOVA analysis (F=0.82, p=0.48). One of those outlier samples with a very low Ct value encountered on April 20th, 2014 yielded the isolate of MERS-CoV C10306, which has been entirely sequenced without any evidence for significant mutations, and which was studied in above-described cell culture experiments without any evidence for increased virulence.
Discussion
The unprecedented increase in new cases of MERS-CoV infections during spring 2014 has caused concern in the public health community worldwide. Our initial sequence analyses communicated during the ongoing outbreak provided a preliminary idea of the molecular epidemiology with outbreak viruses forming a homogeneous, monophyletic clade [4] . Paraphyly of concurrent viruses is expected when infections are independently acquired from a diversified source population such as expected in animal reservoirs. In Riyadh, concurrently circulating viruses were indeed distributed across at least six different clades, suggesting these infections to result from increased zoonotic activity or introduction of human viruses from other regions. One larger virus cluster was observed in Riyadh, associated with one specific hospital suggesting nosocomial transmission (clade 2). The case exported to Indiana/USA had worked in this hospital while the cases in the Netherlands were hospitalized in Madinah but not Riyadh [12, 13] .
This suggests unnoticed transmission links such as infected patients transferred between hospitals, or acquisition from common zoonotic sources.
Interestingly, one of the viruses seen in Riyadh resembled camel viruses in close
relationship to Jeddah-type strains. These viruses may have been widely distributed in camels by late 2013 to early 2014, as they were detected in Taif southwest of Jeddah and in Qatar on the eastern Arabian Peninsula [14, 15] . Viruses encountered in Jeddah shortly before the outbreak such as Jeddah-1 or Jeddah_C6664 were clearly distinct, suggesting that the outbreak might have been initiated by the introduction of Jeddah- Not only did about half of all patients with a positive diagnosis pertain to one particular hospital, but also the first peak case counts in this hospital predated increases elsewhere, and new peaks were followed by peaks of cases in other hospitals. This pattern is highly suggestive of an epidemiological hotspot where the virus is amplified and from where limited transmission chains are seeded. Indeed, King Fahd Hospital is the largest communal hospital in Jeddah serving as the primary care center for all patients attending the MOH healthcare system, as well as for a large fraction of expatriate workers in the city. It is reassuring that the number of new cases in King Fahd Hospital came down toward the end of the study period. This trend started even before changes such as the closure of emergency rooms and the transfer of infected patients were implemented, pointing to the possibility that transmission may have been limited mainly by heightened awareness of the disease among health care workers and patients.
Again, a similar effect has been documented during the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong [17] .
An important observation in case notifications during the outbreak was the increase of cases notified as "asymptomatic" or "mild" in the Jeddah case statistics. As shown in our assessment of sample receptions, the huge amount of laboratory requests during peak phases of the epidemic caused an overload on laboratory capacities without a significant increase of the fraction of requests that were confirmed virus-positive. A low predictive value of clinical suspicion is caused by an insufficient case definition or lack of adherence to the case definition, such as suggested by a high fraction of tests in cases without proper hospital registration number. Unjustified RT-PCR testing raises the likelihood of human error. As far as possible, we have assessed the technical capabilities of JRL and found no general issues of cross-contamination. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude issues elsewhere in the logistics chain, such as near the bedside where diagnostic samples may have been handled in bulk. The high similarity of all Jeddah-type viruses will make it impossible to resolve potential contamination sources retrospectively by sequencing of stored samples. Nevertheless, a certain rate of positive test results in asymptomatic persons might be considered plausible as unnoticed replication has been shown for SARS-CoV whose RNA was detected in exposed healthcare workers with no or mild symptoms, as well as in our recent study on A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
